Computing Machinery and Intelligence

October, 1950

1950年10月

MIND A QUARTERLY REVIEW PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

《心灵》 心理学与哲学季刊

I.—COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE

I.—计算机器与智能

1. The Imitation Game.

1. 模仿游戏。

I PROPOSE to consider the question, ' Can machines think ? ' This should begin with definitions of the meaning of the terms ' machine ' and ' think '. The definitions might be framed so as to reflect so far as possible the normal use of the words, but this attitude is dangerous. If the meaning of the words ' machine ' and ' think ' are to be found by examining how they are commonly used it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the meaning and the answer to the question, ' Can machines think ? ' is to be sought in a statistical survey such as a Gallup poll. But this is absurd. Instead of attempting such a definition I shall replace the question by another, which is closely related to it and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words.

我提议考虑这样一个问题：“机器能思考吗？”这应当从定义“机器”和“思考”这两个术语的含义开始。这些定义可以尽可能反映这些词的通常用法，但这种态度是危险的。如果通过考察“机器”和“思考”这两个词的通常用法来寻找它们的含义，那么就很难避免这样的结论：这些含义以及“机器能思考吗？”这个问题的答案，应当通过像盖洛普民意测验那样的统计调查来寻求。但这是荒谬的。我不试图给出这样的定义，而是用另一个问题来替代这个问题，后者与前者密切相关，并且用相对明确的词语来表达。

The new form of the problem can be described in terms of a game which we call the ' imitation game '. It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart from the other two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine which of the other two is the man and which is the woman. He knows them by labels X and Y, and at the end of the game he says either ' X is A and Y is B ' or ' X is B and Y is A '. The interrogator is allowed to put questions to A and B thus:

这个新形式的问题可以用一个我们称之为“模仿游戏”的游戏来描述。这个游戏由三个人参与：一个男人（A）、一个女人（B）和一个可以是任意性别的询问者（C）。询问者待在一个与另外两人分开的房间里。对于询问者来说，游戏的目标是确定另外两人中谁是男人、谁是女人。他用标签X和Y来称呼他们，在游戏结束时，他要么说“X是A，Y是B”，要么说“X是B，Y是A”。询问者可以向A和B提出如下问题：

C : Will X please tell me the length of his or her hair ?

C：请X告诉我他或她的头发长度好吗？

Now suppose X is actually A, then A must answer. It is A's object in the game to try and cause C to make the wrong identification. His answer might therefore be ' My hair is shingled, and the longest strands are about nine inches long.'

现在假设X实际上是A，那么A必须回答。A在游戏中的目的是试图让C做出错误的识别。因此他的回答可能是“我的头发是瓦片式剪法，最长的发丝大约九英寸长。”

In order that tones of voice may not help the interrogator the answers should be written, or better still, typewritten. The ideal arrangement is to have a teleprinter communicating between the two rooms. Alternatively the question and answers can be repeated by an intermediary. The object of the game for the third player (B) is to help the interrogator. The best strategy for her is probably to give truthful answers. She can add such things as '' I am the woman, don't listen to him ! ' to her answers, but it will avail nothing as the man can make similar remarks.

为了使语调不能帮助询问者，回答应该以书面形式，或者更好的是打字形式。理想的安排是在两个房间之间用电传打字机进行通信。或者，问题和回答可以由中间人重复。游戏中第三个玩家（B）的目标是帮助询问者。对她来说，最好的策略可能是给出真实的回答。她可以在回答中加上诸如“我是女人，别听他的！”之类的话，但这无济于事，因为男人也可以说类似的话。

We now ask the question, ' What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in this game ? ' Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman ? These questions replace our original, ' Can machines think ? '

我们现在问这个问题：“当机器在这个游戏中扮演A的角色时，会发生什么？”当游戏像这样进行时，询问者会像在男人和女人之间进行游戏时一样经常做出错误的判断吗？这些问题取代了我们最初的问题：“机器能思考吗？”

2. Critique of the New Problem.

2. 对新问题的批判

As well as asking, ' What is the answer to this new form of the question ', one may ask, ' Is this new question a worthy one to investigate ? ' This latter question we investigate without further ado, thereby cutting short an infinite regress.

除了问“这个新形式的问题的答案是什么”之外，人们还可以问：“这个新问题值得研究吗？”后一个问题我们不再赘述，直接进行研究，从而避免了无限回归。

The new problem has the advantage of drawing a fairly sharp line between the physical and the intellectual capacities of a man. No engineer or chemist claims to be able to produce a material which is indistinguishable from the human skin. It is possible that at some time this might be done, but even supposing this invention available we should feel there was little point in trying to make a ' thinking machine ' more human by dressing it up in such artificial flesh. The form in which we have set the problem reflects this fact in the condition which prevents the interrogator from seeing or touching the other competitors, or hearing their voices. Some other advantages of the proposed criterion may be shown up by specimen questions and answers. Thus:

新问题的优点在于，它在人的身体能力和智力能力之间划出了一条相当清晰的界线。没有工程师或化学家声称能够制造出与人类皮肤无法区分的材料。有可能在某个时候做到这一点，但即使假设这项发明可用，我们也觉得试图通过给“思考机器”穿上这样的人造肉体来使其更像人是没有意义的。我们设定问题的形式反映了这一事实，即条件阻止询问者看到或触摸其他竞争者，或听到他们的声音。所提议的标准的其他一些优点可以通过示例问题和回答来展示。例如：

Q : Please write me a sonnet on the subject of the Forth Bridge. A : Count me out on this one. I never could write poetry.

问：请给我写一首关于福斯桥的十四行诗。答：这个我不行。我从来不会写诗。

Q : Add 34957 to 70764 . A : (Pause about 30 seconds and then give as answer) 105621.

问：将34957加到70764。答：（停顿约30秒，然后给出答案）105621。

Q : Do you play chess ? A : Yes.

问：你下棋吗？答：是的。

Q : I have K at my K1, and no other pieces. You have only K at K6 and R at R1. It is your move. What do you play ?

问：我的K在K1，没有其他棋子。你只有K在K6和R在R1。轮到你走。你走什么？

A : (After a pause of 15 seconds) R-R8 mate.

答：（停顿15秒后）R-R8将死。

The question and answer method seems to be suitable for introducing almost any one of the fields of human endeavour that we wish to include. We do not wish to penalise the machine for its inability to shine in beauty competitions, nor to penalise a man for losing in a race against an aeroplane. The conditions of our game make these disabilities irrelevant. The ' witnesses ' can brag, if they consider it advisable, as much as they please about their charms, strength or heroism, but the interrogator cannot demand practical demonstrations.

问答方法似乎适合引入我们想要包括的几乎所有人类努力领域。我们不希望因为机器无法在选美比赛中脱颖而出而惩罚它，也不希望因为人在与飞机的赛跑中失败而惩罚他。我们游戏的条件使这些缺陷变得无关紧要。“证人”可以随心所欲地吹嘘自己的魅力、力量或英雄气概，只要他们认为合适，但询问者不能要求实际演示。

The game may perhaps be criticised on the ground that the odds are weighted too heavily against the machine. If the man were to try and pretend to be the machine he would clearly make a very poor showing. He would be given away at once by slowness and inaccuracy in arithmetic. May not machines carry out something which ought to be described as thinking but which is very different from what a man does ? This objection is a very strong one, but at least we can say that if, nevertheless, a machine can be constructed to play the imitation game satisfactorily, we need not be troubled by this objection.

这个游戏或许会受到批评，理由是赔率对机器过于不利。如果人试图假装是机器，他显然会表现得很差。他会立刻因算术的缓慢和不准确而暴露。机器难道不能执行某种应该被描述为思考但与人的所作所为截然不同的事情吗？这个反对意见非常有力，但至少我们可以说，如果尽管如此，仍能构造出一台令人满意地玩模仿游戏的机器，我们就不必为此反对意见所困扰。

It might be urged that when playing the 'imitation game ' the best strategy for the machine may possibly be something other than imitation of the behaviour of a man. This may be, but I think it is unlikely that there is any great effect of this kind. In any case there is no intention to investigate here the theory of the game, and it will be assumed that the best strategy is to try to provide answers that would naturally be given by a man.

可能会有人主张，在玩“模仿游戏”时，机器的最佳策略可能不是模仿人的行为。这有可能，但我认为不太可能有任何此类重大影响。无论如何，这里无意研究游戏理论，并且将假定最佳策略是尝试提供人自然会给出的答案。

3. The Machines concerned in the Game.

3. 游戏中涉及的机器

The question which we put in § 1 will not be quite definite until we have specified what we mean by the word ' machine '. It is natural that we should wish to permit every kind of engineering technique to be used in our machines. We also wish to allow the possibility that an engineer or team of engineers may construct a machine which works, but whose manner of operation cannot be satisfactorily described by its constructors because they have applied a method which is largely experimental. Finally, we wish to exclude from the machines men born in the usual manner. It is difficult to frame the definitions so as to satisfy these three conditions. One might for instance insist that the team of engineers should be all of one sex, but this would not really be satisfactory, for it is probably possible to rear a complete individual from a single cell of the skin (say) of a man. To do so would be a feat of biological technique deserving of the very highest praise, but we would not be inclined to regard it as a case of ' constructing a thinking machine '. This prompts us to abandon the requirement that every kind of technique should be permitted. We are the more ready to do so in view of the fact that the present interest in 'thinking machines ' has been aroused by a particular kind of machine, usually called an ' electronic computer ' or ' digital computer '. Following this suggestion we only permit digital computers to take part in our game.

我们在第1节中提出的问题，在明确“机器”一词的含义之前，不会十分确定。我们自然希望允许在机器中使用各种工程技术。我们也希望允许这样一种可能性：一位工程师或一组工程师可能制造出一台能够工作的机器，但其工作方式无法由制造者令人满意地描述，因为他们采用了一种很大程度上是实验性的方法。最后，我们希望将通常方式出生的人排除在机器之外。很难制定同时满足这三个条件的定义。例如，有人可能坚持工程师团队必须全部是同一性别，但这实际上并不令人满意，因为很可能从一个人的（比如）皮肤单个细胞培育出一个完整的个体。这样做将是生物技术的壮举，值得最高赞誉，但我们不会倾向于将其视为“构造思维机器”的情况。这促使我们放弃允许使用各种技术的要求。鉴于当前对“思维机器”的兴趣是由一种特定类型的机器——通常称为“电子计算机”或“数字计算机”——所激起的，我们更愿意这样做。按照这一建议，我们只允许数字计算机参与我们的游戏。

This restriction appears at first sight to be a very drastic one. I shall attempt to show that it is not so in reality. To do this necessitates a short account of the nature and properties of these computers.

这一限制乍看起来非常严厉。我将试图表明实际上并非如此。要做到这一点，需要简要说明这些计算机的性质和特性。

It may also be said that this identification of machines with digital computers, like our criterion for ' thinking ', will only be unsatisfactory if (contrary to my belief), it turns out that digital computers are unable to give a good showing in the game.

也可以说，将机器等同于数字计算机，就像我们关于“思维”的标准一样，只有在（与我的信念相反）数字计算机无法在游戏中表现出色时，才会令人不满意。

There are already a number of digital computers in working order, and it may be asked, ' Why not try the experiment straight away ? It would be easy to satisfy the conditions of the game. A number of interrogators could be used, and statistics compiled to show how often the right identification was given.' The short answer is that we are not asking whether all digital computers would do well in the game nor whether the computers at present available would do well, but whether there are imaginable computers which would do well. But this is only the short answer. We shall see this question in a different light later.

目前已有许多数字计算机处于工作状态，有人可能会问：“为什么不立即进行实验呢？满足游戏的条件很容易。可以使用多个询问者，并编制统计数据来显示正确识别的频率。”简短的回答是，我们不是在问是否所有数字计算机都能在游戏中表现出色，也不是在问目前可用的计算机是否能表现出色，而是在问是否存在可以想象出的能够表现出色的计算机。但这只是简短的回答。我们稍后将从不同的角度来看待这个问题。

4. Digital Computers.

4. 数字计算机

The idea behind digital computers may be explained by saying that these machines are intended to carry out any operations which could be done by a human computer. The human computer is supposed to be following fixed rules ; he has no authority to deviate from them in any detail. We may suppose that these rules are supplied in a book, which is altered whenever he is put on to a new job. He has also an unlimited supply of paper on which he does his calculations. He may also do his multiplications and additions on a ' desk machine ', but this is not important.

数字计算机背后的思想可以这样解释：这些机器旨在执行人类计算员能够完成的任何操作。人类计算员被假定遵循固定的规则；他无权在任何细节上偏离这些规则。我们可以假设这些规则提供在一本书中，每当他被安排新工作时，这本书就会被更改。他还有无限供应的纸张来进行计算。他也可以在“台式机器”上进行乘法和加法运算，但这并不重要。

If we use the above explanation as a definition we shall be in danger of circularity of argument. We avoid this by giving an outline of the means by which the desired effect is achieved.

如果我们使用上述解释作为定义，我们将面临循环论证的危险。我们通过概述实现预期效果的手段来避免这一点。

A digital computer can usually be regarded as consisting of three parts :

数字计算机通常可以被视为由三个部分组成：

(i) Store. (ii) Executive unit. (iii) Control.

(i) 存储器。 (ii) 执行单元。 (iii) 控制器。

The store is a store of information, and corresponds to the human computer's paper, whether this is the paper on which he does his calculations or that on which his book of rules is printed. In so far as the human computer does calculations in his head a part of the store will correspond to his memory.

存储器是信息的存储库，对应于人类计算员的纸张，无论是他进行计算的纸张还是印有规则手册的纸张。只要人类计算员在头脑中进行计算，存储器的一部分就对应于他的记忆。

The executive unit is the part which carries out the various individual operations involved in a calculation. What these individual operations are will vary from machine to machine. Usually fairly lengthy operations can be done such as ' Multiply 3540675445 by 7076345687 ' but in some machines only very simple ones such as ' Write down 0 ' are possible.

执行单元是执行计算中各种单独操作的部分。这些单独操作是什么因机器而异。通常可以执行相当长的操作，例如“将3540675445乘以7076345687”，但在某些机器中只能执行非常简单的操作，例如“写下0”。

We have mentioned that the 'book of rules' supplied to the computer is replaced in the machine by a part of the store. It is then called the 'table of instructions '. It is the duty of the control to see that these instructions are obeyed correctly and in the right order. The control is so constructed that this necessarily happens.

我们已经提到，提供给计算机的“规则手册”在机器中被存储器的一部分所取代。然后它被称为“指令表”。控制器的职责是确保这些指令被正确且按正确顺序执行。控制器的构造使得这必然发生。

The information in the store is usually broken up into packets of moderately small size. In one machine, for instance, a packet might consist of ten decimal digits. Numbers are assigned to the parts of the store in which the various packets of information are stored, in some systematic manner. A typical instruction might say' Add the number stored in position 6809 to that in 4302 and put the result back into the latter storage position '.

存储器中的信息通常被分成中等大小的数据包。例如，在一台机器中，一个数据包可能由十个十进制数字组成。以某种系统的方式为存储各种信息包的存储器的存储单元分配编号。一条典型的指令可能会说“将存储在位置6809中的数字与位置4302中的数字相加，并将结果放回后一个存储位置”。

Needless to say it would not occur in the machine expressed in English. It would more likely be coded in a form such as 6809430217. Here 17 says which of various possible operations is to be performed on the two numbers. In this case the operation is that described above, viz. 'Add the number. . . .' It will be noticed that the instruction takes up 10 digits and so forms one packet of information, very conveniently. The control will normally take the instructions to be obeyed in the order of the positions in which they are stored, but occasionally an instruction such as ' Now obey the instruction stored in position 5606, and continue from there ' may be encountered, or again' If position 4505 contains 0 obey next the instruction stored in 6707, otherwise continue straight on.'

不用说，它不会以英语形式出现在机器中。它更可能被编码成诸如6809430217的形式。这里17表示要对这两个数字执行各种可能操作中的哪一种。在这种情况下，操作就是上面描述的那个，即“将数字相加\dots\dots”。可以注意到，该指令占用10位数字，因此非常方便地形成一个信息包。控制器通常会按照指令存储位置的顺序来执行指令，但偶尔会有这样的指令“现在遵循存储在位置5606的指令，并从那里继续” 可能会遇到，或者再次 “如果位置4505包含0，则遵循存储在6707中的下一条指令，否则直接继续。”

Instructions of these latter types are very important because they make it possible for a sequence of operations to be repeated over and over again until some condition is fulfilled, but in doing so to obey, not fresh instructions on each repetition, but the same ones over and over again. To take a domestic analogy. Suppose Mother wants Tommy to call at the cobbler's every morning on his way to school to see if her shoes are done, she can ask him afresh every morning. Alternatively she can stick up a notice once and for all in the hall which he will see when he leaves for school and which tolls him to call for the shoes, and also to destroy the notice when he comes back if he has the shoes with him.

后一种类型的指令非常重要，因为它们使得一系列操作可以一遍又一遍地重复，直到满足某个条件，但在重复时遵循的不是每次新的指令，而是相同的指令一遍又一遍。举一个家庭生活的类比。假设母亲希望汤米每天早上去学校的路上到鞋匠那里看看她的鞋子是否修好了，她可以每天早上重新问他。或者，她可以在门厅里一次性贴上一张告示，当他离家上学时会看到，告示叫他去取鞋子，并且如果他带着鞋子回来，就把告示销毁。

The reader must accept it as a fact that digital computers can be constructed, and indeed have been constructed, according to the principles we have described, and that they can in fact mimic the actions of a human computer very closely.

读者必须接受这样一个事实：数字计算机能够按照我们所描述的原理被构造出来，而且实际上已经被构造出来，并且它们确实能够非常接近地模仿人类计算员的动作。

The book of rules which we have described our human computer as using is of course a convenient fiction. Actual human computers really remember what they have got to do. If one wants to make a machine mimic the behaviour of the human computer in some complex operation one has to ask him how it is done, and then translate the answer into the form of an instruction table.

我们所描述的人类计算员使用的规则手册当然是一种方便的虚构。实际的人类计算员真正记得他们必须做什么。如果想让机器在某个复杂操作中模仿人类计算员的行为，就必须问他这是如何完成的，然后将答案翻译成指令表的形式。

Constructing instruction tables is usually described as ' programming '. To ' programme a machine to carry out the operation A ' means to put the appropriate instruction table into the machine so that it will do A.

构建指令表通常被描述为“编程”。“给机器编程以执行操作A”意味着将适当的指令表放入机器中，以便它执行A。

An interesting variant on the idea of a digital computer is a'digital computer with a random element'. These have instructions involving the throwing of a die or some equivalent electronic process ; one such instruction might for instance be,' Throw the die and put the resulting number into store 1000 '. Sometimes such a machine is described as having free will (though I would not use this phrase myself). It is not normally possible to determine from observing a machine whether it has a random element, for a similar effect can be produced by such devices as making the choices depend on the digits of the decimal for π.

数字计算机概念的一个有趣变体是“带有随机元素的数字计算机”。这些计算机具有涉及掷骰子或某种等效电子过程的指令；例如，一条这样的指令可能是：“掷骰子并将结果数字存入存储器1000”。有时这样的机器被描述为具有自由意志（尽管我自己不会使用这个说法）。通常不可能通过观察机器来确定它是否具有随机元素，因为可以通过诸如使选择依赖于π的十进制数字之类的做法来产生类似的效果。

Most actual digital computers have only a finite store. There is no theoretical difficulty in the idea of a computer with an unlimited store. Of course only a finite part can have been used at any one time. Likewise only a finite amount can have been constructed, but we can imagine more and more being added as required. Such computers have special theoretical interest and will be called infinitive capacity computers.

大多数实际的数字计算机只有有限的存储。理论上，设想一台具有无限存储的计算机并无困难。当然，在任何时候只能使用其中的有限部分。同样，只能构造出有限的数量，但我们可以想象根据需要不断增加。这类计算机具有特殊的理论意义，将被称为无限容量计算机。

The idea of a digital computer is an old one. Charles Babbage, Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge from 1828 to 1839, planned such a machine, called the Analytical Engine, but it was never completed. Although Babbage had all the essential ideas, his machine was not at that time such a very attractive prospect. The speed which would have been available would be definitely faster than a human computer but something like 100 times slower than the Manchester machine, itself one of the slower of the modern machines. The storage was to be purely mechanical, using wheels and cards.

数字计算机的想法由来已久。查尔斯\cdot巴贝奇，1828年至1839年任剑桥大学卢卡斯数学教授，曾计划制造这样一台机器，称为分析机，但从未完成。尽管巴贝奇拥有所有基本构想，但他的机器在当时并不是一个很有吸引力的前景。其可达到的速度肯定比人类计算员快，但比曼彻斯特机器慢约100倍，而曼彻斯特机器本身还是现代机器中较慢的一种。“存储器”将纯粹是机械式的，使用轮子和卡片。

The fact that Babbage's Analytical Engine was to be entirely mechanical will help us to rid ourselves of a superstition. Importance is often attached to the fact that modern digital computers are electrical, and that the nervous system also is electrical. Since Babbage's machine was not electrical, and since all digital computers are in a sense equivalent, we see that this use of electricity cannot be of theoretical importance. Of course electricity usually comes in where fast signalling is concerned, so that it is not surprising that we find it in both these connections. In the nervous system chemical phenomena are at least as important as electrical. In certain computers the storage system is mainly acoustic. The feature of using electricity is thus seen to be only a very superficial similarity. If we wish to find such similarities we should look rather for mathematical analogies of function.

巴贝奇的分析机完全采用机械方式这一事实，将有助于我们摆脱一种迷信。人们常常重视现代数字计算机是电气的，以及神经系统也是电气的这一事实。既然巴贝奇的机器不是电气的，而且所有数字计算机在某种意义上都是等价的，我们就可以看出，这种对电的使用在理论上不可能具有重要意义。当然，在涉及快速信号传输时，电通常会出现，因此我们在上述两种情况下都发现电也就不足为奇了。在神经系统中，化学现象至少与电现象同等重要。在某些计算机中，存储系统主要是声学的。因此，使用电这一特征仅是一种非常表面的相似性。如果我们想寻找这样的相似性，更应该关注功能的数学类比。

5. Universality of Digital Computers.

5. 数字计算机的通用性

The digital computers considered in the last section may be classified amongst the ' discrete state machines '. These are the machines which move by sudden jumps or clicks from one quite definite state to another. These states are sufficiently different for the possibility of confusion between them to be ignored. Strictly speaking there are no such machines. Everything really moves continuously. But there are many kinds of machine which can profitably be thought of as being discrete state machines. For instance in considering the switches for a lighting system it is a convenient fiction that each switch must be definitely on or definitely off. There must be intermediate positions, but for most purposes we can forget about them. As an example of a discrete state machine we might consider a wheel which clicks round through 120° once a second, but may be stopped by a lever which can be operated from outside ; in addition a lamp is to light in one of the positions of the wheel. This machine could be described abstractly as follows. The internal state of the machine (which is described by the position of the wheel) may be q1, q2 or q3. There is an input signal i0 or i1 (position of lever). The internal state at any moment is determined by the last state and input signal according to the table

上一节所考虑的数字计算机可以归类为“离散状态机”。这些机器通过突然的跳跃或咔嗒声从一个相当确定的状态移动到另一个状态。这些状态之间的差异足够大，以至于可以忽略它们之间混淆的可能性。严格来说，并不存在这样的机器。一切实际上都是连续运动的。但有许多种机器可以被有益地视为离散状态机。例如，在考虑照明系统的开关时，一个方便的虚构是每个开关必须明确地开或明确地关。必然存在中间位置，但在大多数情况下我们可以忽略它们。作为离散状态机的一个例子，我们可以考虑一个轮子，它每秒咔嗒转动120°，但可以被一个可以从外部操作的杠杆停止；此外，在轮子的一个位置上有一盏灯要亮。这台机器可以抽象地描述如下。机器的内部状态（由轮子的位置描述）可以是q1、q2或q3。有一个输入信号i0或i1（杠杆的位置）。任何时刻的内部状态由上一个状态和输入信号根据表格决定

q_1

Input / Last state	$q_1$	$q_2$	$q_3$
$i_0$	$q_2$	$q_3$	$q_1$
$i_1$	$q_1$	$q_2$	$q_3$

q_1

输入 / 上一状态	$q_1$	$q_2$	$q_3$
$i_0$	$q_2$	$q_3$	$q_1$
$i_1$	$q_1$	$q_2$	$q_3$

The output signals, the only externally visible indication of the internal state (the light) are described by the table

输出信号，即内部状态唯一外部可见的指示（灯光），由下表描述

q_1

State	$q_1$	$q_2$	$q_3$
Output	$o_0$	$o_0$	$o_1$

q_1

状态	$q_1$	$q_2$	$q_3$
输出	$o_0$	$o_0$	$o_1$

This example is typical of discrete state machines. They can be described by such tables provided they have only a finite number of possible states.

这个例子是离散状态机的典型。只要它们只有有限数量的可能状态，就可以用这样的表来描述。

It will seem that given the initial state of the machine and the input signals it is always possible to predict all future states. This is reminiscent of Laplace's view that from the complete state of the universe at one moment of time, as described by the positions and velocities of all particles, it should be possible to predict all future states. The prediction which we are considering is, however, rather nearer to practicability than that considered by Laplace. The system of the ' universe as a whole ' is such that quite small errors in the initial conditions can have an overwhelming effect at a later time. The displacement of a single electron by a billionth of a centimetre at one moment might make the difference between a man being killed by an avalanche a year later, or escaping. It is an essential property of the mechanical systems which we have called ' discrete state machines ' that this phenomenon does not occur. Even when we consider the actual physical machines instead of the idealised machines, reasonably accurate knowledge of the state at one moment yields reasonably accurate knowledge any number of steps later.

看起来，给定机器的初始状态和输入信号，总是可以预测所有未来状态。这让人想起拉普拉斯的观点：从宇宙在某一时刻的完整状态（由所有粒子的位置和速度描述）出发，应该可以预测所有未来状态。然而，我们正在考虑的这种预测比拉普拉斯所考虑的更接近实际。'宇宙整体'这个系统是这样的：初始条件中相当小的误差在以后的时间里可能产生压倒性的影响。一个电子在某一时刻被移动一厘米的十亿分之一，就可能造成一个人在一年后死于雪崩或得以逃脱的差别。我们称之为'离散状态机'的机械系统的一个基本特性就是这种现象不会发生。即使我们考虑实际的物理机器而不是理想化的机器，对某一时刻状态的相当准确的知识也能在任意多步之后产生相当准确的知识。

2^{165,000}

2^{165,000}

Given the table corresponding to a discrete state machine it is possible to predict what it will do. There is no reason why this calculation should not be carried out by means of a digital computer. Provided it could be carried out sufficiently quickly the digital computer could mimic the behaviour of any discrete state machine. The imitation game could then be played with the machine in question (as B) and the mimicking digital computer (as A) and the interrogator would be unable to distinguish them. Of course the digital computer must have an adequate storage capacity as well as working sufficiently fast. Moreover, it must be programmed afresh for each new machine which it is desired to mimic.

给定与离散状态机对应的表，就可以预测它将做什么。没有理由不通过数字计算机来进行这种计算。只要能够足够快地进行，数字计算机就可以模仿任何离散状态机的行为。然后就可以用被询问的机器（作为 B）和模仿的数字计算机（作为 A）来玩模仿游戏，而询问者将无法区分它们。当然，数字计算机必须有足够的存储容量，并且工作速度足够快。此外，对于每一个希望模仿的新机器，它都必须重新编程。

This special property of digital computers, that they can mimic any discrete state machine, is described by saying that they are universal machines. The existence of machines with this property has the important consequence that, considerations of speed apart, it is unnecessary to design various new machines to do various computing processes. They can all, be done with one digital computer, suitably programmed for each case. It will be seen that as a consequence of this all digital computers are in a sense equivalent.

数字计算机的这种特殊性质，即它们可以模仿任何离散状态机，被描述为它们是通用机器。具有这种性质的机器的存在具有重要的后果，即在不考虑速度的情况下，没有必要设计各种新机器来执行各种计算过程。它们都可以用一台数字计算机完成，只需针对每种情况适当编程。可以看出，因此所有数字计算机在某种意义上都是等价的。

We may now consider again the point raised at the end of §3. It was suggested tentatively that the question, ' Can machines think ? ' should be replaced by ' Are there imaginable digital computers which would do well in the imitation game ? ' If we wish we can make this superficially more general and ask ' Are there discrete state machines which would do well ? ' But in view of the universality property we see that either of these questions is equivalent to this, ' Let us fix our attention on one particular digital computer C. Is it true that by modifying this computer to have an adequate storage, suitably increasing its speed of action, and providing it with an appropriate programme, C can be made to play satisfactorily the part of A in the imitation game, the part of B being taken by a man ? '

我们现在可以再次考虑第3节末尾提出的问题。当时试探性地建议，将“机器能思考吗？”这个问题替换为“是否存在可想象的数字计算机，能够在模仿游戏中表现出色？”如果我们愿意，可以表面上使其更一般化，并问“是否存在离散状态机能够表现出色？”但鉴于通用性，我们看到这两个问题中的任何一个都等价于：“让我们将注意力集中在一台特定的数字计算机C上。通过修改这台计算机使其具有足够的存储容量，适当提高其运行速度，并为其提供适当的程序，是否真的可以让C在模仿游戏中令人满意地扮演A的角色，而B的角色由人来扮演？”

6. Contrary Views on the Main Question:

6. 关于主要问题的相反观点

We may now consider the ground to have been cleared and we are ready to proceed to the debate on our question, 'Can machines think ? ' and the variant of it quoted at the end of the last section. We cannot altogether abandon the original form of the problem, for opinions will differ as to the appropriateness of the substitution and we must at least listen to what has to be said in this connexion.

我们现在可以认为基础已经清理完毕，准备就我们的问题“机器能思考吗？”以及上一节末尾引用的变体进行辩论。我们不能完全放弃问题的原始形式，因为对于替换的适当性会有不同意见，我们至少必须听取与此相关的意见。

10^9

10^{9}

The popular view that scientists proceed inexorably from well-established fact to well-established fact, never being influenced by any unproved conjecture, is quite mistaken. Provided it is made clear which are proved facts and which are conjectures, no harm can result. Conjectures are of great importance since they suggest useful lines of research.

流行的观点认为科学家从确凿的事实无情地推进到确凿的事实，从不受到任何未经证实的猜想的影响，这是完全错误的。只要明确哪些是已证实的事实，哪些是猜想，就不会产生任何危害。猜想非常重要，因为它们提出了有用的研究方向。

I now proceed to consider opinions opposed to my own.

我现在开始考虑反对我自己的观点。

(1) The Theological Objection.

（1）神学异议

Thinking is a function of man's immortal soul. God has given an immortal soul to every man and woman, but not to any other animal or to machines. Hence no animal or machine can think.

思维是人类不朽灵魂的功能。上帝赋予每个男人和女人不朽的灵魂，但没有赋予任何其他动物或机器。因此，任何动物或机器都不能思考。

I am unable to accept any part of this, but will attempt to reply in theological terms. I should find the argument more convincing if animals were classed with men, for there is a greater difference, to my mind, between the typical animate and the inanimate than there is between man and the other animals.

我无法接受这一观点的任何部分，但将尝试用神学术语来回应。如果动物与人归为一类，我会觉得这个论证更有说服力，因为在我看来，典型的有生命物与无生命物之间的差异，比人与其他动物之间的差异更大。

The arbitrary character of the orthodox view becomes clearer if we consider how it might appear to a member of some other religious community. How do Christians regard the Moslem view that women have no souls ? But let us leave this point aside and return to the main argument. It appears to me that the argument quoted above implies a serious restriction of the omnipotence of the Almighty. It is admitted that there are certain things that He cannot do such as making one equal to two, but should we not believe that He has freedom to confer a soul on an elephant if He sees fit ? We might expect that He would only exercise this power in conjunction with a mutation which provided the elephant with an appropriately improved brain to minister to the needs of this soul. An argument of exactly similar form may be made for the case of machines. It may seem different because it is more difficult to " swallow ". But this really only means that we think it would be less likely that He would consider the circumstances suitable for conferring a soul. The circumstances in question are discussed in the rest of this paper.

如果我们考虑正统观点在某个其他宗教团体成员看来会如何，其任意性就变得更加明显。基督徒如何看待穆斯林认为女性没有灵魂的观点？但让我们暂且搁置这一点，回到主要论证。在我看来，上面引用的论证意味着对全能者全能性的严重限制。人们承认有些事情祂不能做，比如使一等于二，但我们难道不应该相信，如果祂认为合适，祂有自由将灵魂赋予一头大象吗？我们可能预期，祂只会在一种突变的同时行使这种能力，这种突变为大象提供了一个适当改进的大脑，以满足这个灵魂的需要。对于机器的情况，可以提出形式完全相同的论证。它可能看起来不同，因为它更难以“接受”。但这实际上只意味着我们认为祂认为情况适合赋予灵魂的可能性较小。所讨论的情况将在本文其余部分讨论。

In attempting to construct such machines we should not be irreverently usurping His power of creating souls, any more than we are in the procreation of children: rather we are, in either case, instruments of His will providing mansions for the souls that He creates.

在试图构建这样的机器时，我们不应不敬地篡夺祂创造灵魂的权力，正如我们在生育子女时也没有篡夺一样：相反，在任何一种情况下，我们都是祂意志的工具，为祂创造的灵魂提供居所。

However, this is mere speculation. I am not very impressed with theological arguments whatever they may be used to support. Such arguments have often been found unsatisfactory in the past. In the time of Galileo it was argued that the texts, "And the sun stood still . . . and hasted not to go down about a whole day " (Joshua x. 13) and " He laid the foundations of the earth, that it should not move at any time " (Psalm cv. 5) were an adequate refutation of the Copernican theory. With our present knowledge such an argument appears futile. When that knowledge was not available it made a quite different impression.

然而，这仅仅是猜测。我对神学论证并不十分信服，无论它们被用来支持什么。这类论证在过去常常被发现不能令人满意。在伽利略时代，有人争辩说，经文“日头停留\dots\dots约有一整日没有急速落下”（约书亚记10:13）和“他将地立在根基上，使地永不动摇”（诗篇105:5）足以反驳哥白尼的理论。以我们现在的知识来看，这样的论证显得徒劳。当那种知识尚未获得时，它给人的印象则完全不同。

Possibly this view is heretical. St. Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologica, quoted by Bertrand Russell, p. 480) states that God cannot make a man to have no soul. But this may not be a real restriction on His powers, but only a result of the fact that men's souls are immortal, and therefore indestructible.

这种观点可能是异端。圣托马斯\cdot阿奎那（《神学大全》，伯特兰\cdot罗素引用，第480页）指出，上帝不能使人没有灵魂。但这可能不是对祂能力的真正限制，而只是人的灵魂不朽、因此不可毁灭这一事实的结果。

(2) The ' Heads in the Sand ' Objection.

（2）“鸵鸟政策”式反对意见。

" The consequences of machines thinking would be too dreadful. Let us hope and believe that they cannot do so."

“机器思维的后果将太过可怕。让我们希望并相信它们做不到这一点。”

This argument is seldom expressed quite so openly as in the form above. But it affects most of us who think about it at all. We like to believe that Man is in some subtle way superior to the rest of creation. It is best if he can be shown to be necessarily superior, for then there is no danger of him losing his commanding position. The popularity of the theological argument is clearly connected with this feeling. It is likely to be quite strong in intellectual people, since they value the power of thinking more highly than others, and are more inclined to base their belief in the superiority of Man on this power.

这种论点很少像上面那样公开表达。但它影响着我们大多数思考过这个问题的人。我们愿意相信人类在某种微妙的方式上优于其他造物。如果能够证明人类必然优越，那是最好的，因为这样他就没有失去支配地位的危险。神学论证的流行显然与这种感觉有关。这种情感在知识分子中可能相当强烈，因为他们比其他人更看重思维能力，更倾向于将人类优越性的信念建立在这种能力之上。

I do not think that this argument is sufficiently substantial to require refutation. Consolation would be more appropriate : perhaps this should be sought in the transmigration of souls.

我认为这个论点不够实质，无需反驳。安慰或许更为合适：也许这应该从灵魂转世中寻求。

(3) The Mathematical Objection.

（3）数学上的反对意见。

数学逻辑中有许多结果可以用来证明离散状态机的力量存在局限性。其中最著名的结果被称为哥德尔定理，它表明在任何足够强大的逻辑系统中，都可以构造出既不能在该系统内被证明也不能被否证的命题，除非该系统本身是不一致的。还有其他一些在某些方面类似的结果，由丘奇、克莱尼、罗瑟和图灵得出。后者的结果最便于考虑，因为它直接涉及机器，而其他的结果只能通过比较间接的论证来使用：例如，如果要使用哥德尔定理，我们还需要有某种方法来用机器描述逻辑系统，以及用逻辑系统描述机器。所讨论的结果涉及一种本质上具有无限容量的数字计算机。它表明这种机器有某些不能做的事情。如果将其设置为像模仿游戏中那样回答问题，那么会有一些问题，它要么给出错误答案，要么无论允许多少时间作答都根本给不出答案。当然，可能有许多这样的问题，而且一台机器无法回答的问题可能由另一台机器满意地回答。我们目前当然假设这些问题是适合回答“是”或“否”的那类问题，而不是像“你觉得毕加索怎么样？”这样的问题。我们知道机器必定失败的问题属于这种类型：“考虑如下指定的机器\dots\dots这台机器会对任何问题回答‘是’吗？”省略号要用某种标准形式的机器描述来替换，这种描述可以类似于第5节中使用的那种。当所描述的机器与受审机器之间存在某种相对简单的关系时，可以证明答案要么错误，要么不会出现。这是数学结果：有人认为这证明了机器具有人类智力所不具备的缺陷。

Author's names in italics refer to the Bibliography.

斜体的作者姓名参见参考文献。

The short answer to this argument is that although it is established that there are limitations to the powers of any particular machine, it has only been stated, without any sort of proof, that no such limitations apply to the human intellect. But I do not think this view can be dismissed quite so lightly. Whenever one of these machines is asked the appropriate critical question, and gives a definite answer, we know that this answer must be wrong, and this gives us a certain feeling of superiority. Is this feeling illusory ? It is no doubt quite genuine, but I do not think too much importance should be attached to it. We too often give wrong answers to questions ourselves to be justified in being very pleased at such evidence of fallibility on the part of the machines. Further, our superiority can only be felt on such an occasion in relation to the one machine over which we have scored our petty triumph. There would be no question of triumphing simultaneously over all machines. In short, then, there might be men cleverer than any given machine, but then again there might be other machines cleverer again, and so on.

对这一论点的简短回答是，尽管已经确定任何特定机器的能力都存在局限性，但只是陈述了人类智力没有这种局限性，而没有任何形式的证明。但我认为不能如此轻率地否定这种观点。每当这些机器之一被问到适当的批判性问题，并给出明确答案时，我们知道这个答案必定是错误的，这给我们带来某种优越感。这种感觉是虚幻的吗？它无疑是相当真实的，但我认为不应过分重视它。我们自己回答问题也经常出错，因此没有理由为机器犯错的证据而沾沾自喜。此外，我们的优越感只能在这种情况下相对于我们取得小小胜利的那一台机器感受到。不存在同时战胜所有机器的问题。简而言之，可能有比任何给定机器更聪明的人，但同样可能有更聪明的机器，如此等等。

Those who hold to the mathematical argument would, I think, mostly be willing to accept the imitation game as a basis for discussion. Those who believe in the two previous objections would probably not be interested in any criteria.

我认为，坚持数学论证的人大多愿意接受模仿游戏作为讨论的基础。相信前两种反对意见的人可能对任何标准都不感兴趣。

(4) The Argument from Consciousness.

(4) 来自意识的论证

This argument is very well expressed in Professor Jefferson's Lister Oration for 1949, from which I quote. " Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of thoughts and emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we agree that machine equals brain-that is, not only write it but know that it had written it. No mechanism could feel (and not merely artificially signal, an easy contrivance) pleasure at its successes, grief when its valves fuse, be warmed by flattery, be made miserable by its mistakes, be charmed by sex, be angry or depressed when it cannot get what it wants."

这一论点在杰斐逊教授1949年的利斯特演说中表达得非常好，我引用如下：“除非一台机器能够因为感受到的思想和情感而写出一首十四行诗或创作一首协奏曲，而不是通过符号的偶然排列，我们才能同意机器等同于大脑——也就是说，不仅写出它，而且知道它已经写出了它。没有任何机制能够感受（而不仅仅是人为地发出信号，这是一种简单的设计）成功时的快乐，电子管烧坏时的悲伤，因奉承而感到温暖，因错误而痛苦，被性所吸引，因得不到想要的东西而愤怒或沮丧。”

This argument appears to be a denial of the validity of our test. According to the most extreme form of this view the only way by which one could be sure that a machine thinks is to be the machine and to feel oneself thinking. One could then describe these feelings to the world, but of course no one would be justified in taking any notice. Likewise according to this view the only way to know that a man thinks is to be that particular man. It is in fact the solipsist point of view. It may be the most logical view to hold but it makes communication of ideas difficult. A is liable to believe ' A thinks but B does not ' whilst B believes ' B thinks but A does not '. Instead of arguing continually over this point it is usual to have the polite convention that everyone thinks.

这一论点似乎是在否认我们测试的有效性。根据这种观点最极端的形式，要确定一台机器会思考的唯一方法就是成为那台机器并感受到自己在思考。然后可以向世界描述这些感受，但当然没有人有理由去理会。同样，根据这种观点，要知道一个人会思考的唯一方法就是成为那个特定的人。这实际上是唯我论的观点。这可能是最合乎逻辑的观点，但它使思想的交流变得困难。A 容易相信“A 思考而 B 不思考”，而 B 相信“B 思考而 A 不思考”。与其在这个问题上不断争论，通常的做法是遵循礼貌的惯例，即每个人都思考。

I am sure that Professor Jefferson does not wish to adopt the extreme and solipsist point of view. Probably he would be quite willing to accept the imitation game as a test. The game (with the player B omitted) is frequently used in practice under the name of viva voce to discover whether some one really understands something or has ' learnt it parrot fashion '. Let us listen in to a part of such a viva voce :

我确信杰斐逊教授并不希望采纳这种极端的唯我论观点。很可能他会非常愿意接受模仿游戏作为测试。这种游戏（省略玩家 B）在实践中经常以口试的名义使用，以发现某人是否真正理解某事物，还是只是“鹦鹉学舌般地学会了”。让我们来听一段这样的口试：

Interrogator: In the first line of your sonnet which reads ' Shall I compare thee to a summer's day ', would not ' a spring day ' do as well or better ?

提问者：在你十四行诗的第一行“我能否将你比作夏日”，用“春日”不是一样好，甚至更好吗？

Witness : It wouldn't scan.

证人：那就不合韵律了。

Interrogator : How about ' a winter's day ' That would scan all right.

提问者：那“冬日”呢？那韵律就完全没问题。

Witness : Yes, but nobody wants to be compared to a winter's day.

证人：是的，但没有人愿意被比作冬日。

Interrogator: Would you say Mr. Pickwick reminded you of Christmas ?

提问者：你会说匹克威克先生让你想起了圣诞节吗？

Witness : In a way.

证人：在某种程度上。

Interrogator: Yet Christmas is a winter's day, and I do not think Mr. Pickwick would mind the comparison.

提问者：然而圣诞节是一个冬日，我认为匹克威克先生不会介意这种比较。

Witness : I don't think you're serious. By a winter's day one means a typical winter's day, rather than a special one like Christmas.

证人：我认为你不是认真的。所谓冬日，指的是一个典型的冬日，而不是像圣诞节那样特殊的日子。

And so on. What would Professor Jefferson say if the sonnet-writing machine was able to answer like this in the viva voce ? I do not know whether he would regard the machine as ' merely artificially signalling ' these answers, but if the answers were as satisfactory and sustained as in the above passage I do not think he would describe it as ' an easy contrivance '. This phrase is, I think, intended to cover such devices as the inclusion in the machine of a record of someone reading a sonnet, with appropriate switching to turn it on from time to time.

如此等等。如果写十四行诗的机器能在口试中这样回答，杰斐逊教授会怎么说呢？我不知道他是否会认为这台机器“仅仅是在人为地发出信号”来给出这些答案，但如果答案像上述段落那样令人满意且持续不断，我认为他不会将其描述为“一种简单的装置”。我认为，这个短语意在涵盖诸如在机器中放入某人朗读十四行诗的录音，并配以适当的开关以便不时开启之类的装置。

In short then, I think that most of those who support the argument from consciousness could be persuaded to abandon it rather than be forced into the solipsist position. They will then probably be willing to accept our test.

总之，我认为大多数支持意识论证的人可以被说服放弃这一论证，而不至于被迫陷入唯我论的立场。届时，他们或许会愿意接受我们的测试。

I do not wish to give the impression that I think there is no mystery about consciousness. There is, for instance, something of a paradox connected with any attempt to localise it. But I do not think these mysteries necessarily need to be solved before we can answer the question with which we are concerned in this paper.

我并不想给人留下我认为意识毫无神秘之处的印象。例如，任何试图定位意识的尝试都伴随着某种悖论。但我认为，在回答本文所关注的问题之前，这些神秘之处未必需要得到解决。

(5) Arguments from Various Disabilities.

（5）来自各种缺陷的论证。

These arguments take the form, " I grant you that you can make machines do all the things you have mentioned but you will never be able to make one to do X ". Numerous features X are suggested in this connexion. I offer a selection :

这些论证的形式是：“我承认你可以让机器做你提到的所有事情，但你永远无法让一台机器去做X。”在这方面人们提出了许多特征X。我提供一些例子：

Be kind, resourceful, beautiful, friendly (p. 448), have initiative, have a sense of humour, tell right from wrong, make mistakes (p. 448), fall in love, enjoy strawberries and cream (p. 448), make some one fall in love with it, learn from experience (pp. 456 f.), use words properly, be the subject of its own thought (p. 449), have as much diversity of behaviour as a man, do something really new (p. 450). (Some of these disabilities are given special consideration as indicated by the page numbers.)

善良、足智多谋、美丽、友好（第448页），有主动性，有幽默感，明辨是非，犯错误（第448页），坠入爱河，享受草莓和奶油（第448页），让某人爱上它，从经验中学习（第456页及以后），恰当地使用词语，成为自身思考的对象（第449页），行为多样性与人一样丰富，做出真正新颖的事情（第450页）。（其中一些缺陷按页码所示得到了特别考虑。）

No support is usually offered for these statements. I believe they are mostly founded on the principle of scientific induction. A man has seen thousands of machines in his lifetime. From what he sees of them he draws a number of general conclusions. They are ugly, each is designed for a very limited purpose, when required for a minutely different purpose they are useless, the variety of behaviour of any one of them is very small, etc., etc. Naturally he concludes that these are necessary properties of machines in general. Many of these limitations are associated with the very small storage capacity of most machines. (I am assuming that the idea of storage capacity is extended in some way to cover machines other than discrete-state machines. The exact definition does not matter as no mathematical accuracy is claimed in the present discussion.) A few years ago, when very little had been heard of digital computers, it was possible to elicit much incredulity concerning them, if one mentioned their properties without describing their construction. That was presumably due to a similar application of the principle of scientific induction. These applications of the principle are of course largely unconscious. When a burnt child fears the fire and shows that he fears it by avoiding it, I should say that he was applying scientific induction. (I could of course also describe his behaviour in many other ways.) The works and customs of mankind do not seem to be very suitable material to which to apply scientific induction. A very large part of space-time must be investigated, if reliable results are to be obtained. Otherwise we may (as most English children do) decide that everybody speaks English, and that it is silly to learn French.

这些说法通常没有提供任何依据。我相信它们大多建立在科学归纳的原则之上。一个人一生中见过成千上万台机器。根据他所看到的，他得出了一些一般性结论。它们丑陋，每台机器都是为非常有限的目的而设计的，当需要用于细微不同的目的时它们就毫无用处，任何一台机器的行为多样性都非常小，等等。他自然得出结论，这些是机器的一般必然属性。这些局限性中有许多与大多数机器非常小的存储容量有关。（我假设存储容量的概念以某种方式扩展，以涵盖离散状态机以外的机器。确切的定义无关紧要，因为在当前的讨论中并不要求数学上的精确性。）几年前，当人们对数字计算机还知之甚少时，如果只提及它们的特性而不描述其构造，就可能引起许多怀疑。这大概是由于类似地应用了科学归纳原理。这些原理的应用当然在很大程度上是无意识的。当一个被烧伤的孩子害怕火并通过躲避火来表现出他的害怕时，我会说他在应用科学归纳。（我当然也可以用许多其他方式来描述他的行为。）人类的工作和习俗似乎并不是应用科学归纳的非常合适的材料。如果要获得可靠的结果，就必须研究时空的很大一部分。否则，我们可能会（像大多数英国孩子那样）断定每个人都说英语，并且认为学法语是愚蠢的。

There are, however, special remarks to be made about many of the disabilities that have been mentioned. The inability to enjoy strawberries and cream may have struck the reader as frivolous. Possibly a machine might be made to enjoy this delicious dish, but any attempt to make one do so would be idiotic. What is important about this disability is that it contributes to some of the other disabilities, e.g. to the difficulty of the same kind of friendliness occurring between man and machine as between white man and white man, or between black man and black man.

然而，对于已经提到的许多缺陷，还有一些特别的评论需要说明。无法享受草莓和奶油可能让读者觉得是轻率的。也许可以制造一台机器来享受这道美味的菜肴，但任何试图这样做的尝试都是愚蠢的。这个缺陷的重要性在于它助长了其他一些缺陷，例如，在人与机器之间产生像白人与白人之间或黑人与黑人之间那样的同一种友好关系是困难的。

“机器不会犯错”这一说法似乎很奇怪。人们很想反驳说：“难道它们因此就更差了吗？”但让我们采取一种更同情的态度，试着看看真正的意思是什么。我认为这种批评可以用模仿游戏来解释。据称，询问者只需给机器和人出一些算术题，就能把机器和人区分开来。机器会因为其致命的准确性而被揭穿。对此的回答很简单。机器（为玩游戏而编程）不会试图给出算术问题的正确答案。它会故意以一种旨在迷惑询问者的方式引入错误。机械故障可能会通过一个不合适的决定表现出来，即决定在算术中犯什么样的错误。即使是对这种批评的这种解释也不够同情。但我们没有篇幅进一步深入探讨。这种批评似乎源于对两种错误的混淆。我们可以称之为“功能错误”和“结论错误”。功能错误是由于某些机械或电气故障导致机器行为偏离设计初衷。在哲学讨论中，人们倾向于忽略此类错误的可能性；因此讨论的是“抽象机器”。这些抽象机器是数学虚构而非物理对象。根据定义，它们不可能出现功能错误。在这个意义上，我们可以真正地说“机器永远不会犯错”。结论错误只有在机器的输出信号被赋予某种意义时才会产生。例如，机器可能打印出数学方程或英语句子。当打印出错误命题时，我们说机器犯了结论错误。显然，没有任何理由说机器不能犯这种错误。它可能只会反复打印“0 = 1”。举一个不那么反常的例子，它可能有某种通过科学归纳得出结论的方法。我们必须预料到这种方法偶尔会导致错误的结果。

x^2-40x-11=0

x^2-40x-11=0

The criticism that a machine cannot have much diversity of behaviour is just a way of saying that it cannot have much storage capacity. Until fairly recently a storage capacity of even a thousand digits was very rare.

批评机器不能有多样化行为，只是说它不能有太大的存储容量。直到相当近期，即使是一千位数字的存储容量也非常罕见。

The criticisms that we are considering here are often disguised forms of the argument from consciousness. Usually if one maintains that a machine can do one of these things, and describes the kind of method that the machine could use, one will not make much of an impression. It is thought that the method (whatever it may be, for it must be mechanical) is really rather base. Compare the parenthesis in Jefferson's statement quoted on p. 21.

我们在此考虑的这些批评，往往是意识论证的伪装形式。通常，如果一个人坚持认为机器能做这些事情之一，并描述机器可能使用的那种方法，他不会给人留下太深的印象。人们认为这种方法（无论它是什么，因为它必须是机械的）实际上相当低级。比较第21页引用的杰斐逊陈述中的括号。

(6) Lady Lovelace's Objection.

（6）洛夫莱斯夫人的反对意见。

Our most detailed information of Babbage's Analytical Engine comes from a memoir by Lady Lovelace. In it she states, "The Analytical Engine has no pretensions to originate anything. It can do whatever we know how to order it to perform" (her italics). This statement is quoted by Hartree (p. 70) who adds: "This does not imply that it may not be possible to construct electronic equipment which will 'think for itself', or in which, in biological terms, one could set up a conditioned reflex, which would serve as a basis for 'learning'. Whether this is possible in principle or not is a stimulating and exciting question, suggested by some of these recent developments. But it did not seem that the machines constructed or projected at the time had this property".

我们对巴贝奇分析机最详细的了解来自洛夫莱斯夫人的一篇回忆录。她在其中写道：“分析机没有任何创造任何东西的意图。它能做任何我们知道如何命令它执行的事情”（她的斜体）。哈特里（第70页）引用了这一陈述，并补充道：“这并不意味着不可能建造出能够‘独立思考’的电子设备，或者从生物学的角度来说，可以在其中建立条件反射，作为‘学习’的基础。这在原则上是否可能，是一个由这些近期发展所引发的令人振奋和激动的问题。但当时建造或设计的机器似乎并不具备这种特性。”

I am in thorough agreement with Hartree over this. It will be noticed that he does not assert that the machines in question had not got the property, but rather that the evidence available to Lady Lovelace did not encourage her to believe that they had it. It is quite possible that the machines in question had in a sense got this property. For suppose that some discrete-state machine has the property. The Analytical Engine was a universal digital computer, so that, if its storage capacity and speed were adequate, it could by suitable programming be made to mimic the machine in question. Probably this argument did not occur to the Countess or to Babbage. In any case there was no obligation on them to claim all that could be claimed.

在这一点上，我完全同意哈特里的观点。值得注意的是，他并没有断言所讨论的机器不具备这种特性，而是说洛夫莱斯夫人当时所掌握的证据不足以使她相信它们具备这种特性。所讨论的机器在某种意义上很可能确实具备这种特性。因为假设某台离散状态机具有这种特性。分析机是一台通用数字计算机，因此，如果其存储容量和速度足够，它可以通过适当的编程来模拟所讨论的机器。这个论点可能伯爵夫人或巴贝奇都没有想到。无论如何，他们没有义务声称所有可以声称的东西。

This whole question will be considered again under the heading of learning machines.

整个问题将在学习机器这一标题下再次讨论。

A variant of Lady Lovelace's objection states that a machine can 'never do anything really new'. This may be parried for a moment with the saw, 'There is nothing new under the sun'. Who can be certain that 'original work' that he has done was not simply the growth of the seed planted in him by teaching, or the effect of following well-known general principles. A better variant of the objection says that a machine can never 'take us by surprise'. This statement is a more direct challenge and can be met directly. Machines take me by surprise with great frequency. This is largely because I do not do sufficient calculation to decide what to expect them to do, or rather because, although I do a calculation, I do it in a hurried, slipshod fashion, taking risks. Perhaps I say to myself, 'I suppose the voltage here ought to be the same as there: anyway let's assume it is'.

洛夫莱斯夫人反对意见的一个变体指出，机器“永远不能做出真正新颖的事情”。这可以用一句谚语暂时抵挡：“太阳底下无新事”。谁能确定他所做的“原创工作”不是由教导在他心中播下的种子的生长，或者不是遵循众所周知的一般原则的结果。反对意见的一个更好的变体说，机器永远不能“让我们感到惊讶”。这一陈述是更直接的挑战，可以直接应对。机器经常让我感到惊讶。这很大程度上是因为我没有进行足够的计算来决定期望它们做什么，或者更确切地说，虽然我进行了计算，但我是以匆忙、草率的方式进行的，承担了风险。也许我对自己说：“我想这里的电压应该和那里一样：无论如何，让我们假设是这样。”

Naturally I am often wrong, and the result is a surprise for me for by the time the experiment is done these assumptions have been forgotten. These admissions lay me open to lectures on the subject of my vicious ways, but do not throw any doubt on my credibility when I testify to the surprises I experience.

自然，我经常出错，结果对我来说是意外的，因为当实验完成时，这些假设已经被遗忘了。这些承认使我容易受到关于我恶习的说教，但当我作证我所经历的意外时，并不会对我的可信度产生任何怀疑。

I do not expect this reply to silence my critic. He will probably say that such surprises are due to some creative mental act on my part, and reflect no credit on the machine. This leads us back to the argument from consciousness, and far from the idea of surprise. It is a line of argument we must consider closed, but it is perhaps worth remarking that the appreciation of something as surprising requires as much of a ' creative mental act ' whether the surprising event originates from a man, a book, a machine or anything else.

我并不指望这个回答能让我的批评者闭嘴。他可能会说，这些意外是由于我自身的某种创造性心理行为，并不归功于机器。这又把我们带回到意识论证，远离了意外的概念。我们必须认为这条论证路线已经结束，但或许值得指出的是，对某事物感到意外需要同样多的“创造性心理行为”，无论意外事件源于人、书、机器还是其他任何事物。

The view that machines cannot give rise to surprises is due, I believe, to a fallacy to which philosophers and mathematicians are particularly subject. This is the assumption that as soon as a fact is presented to a mind all consequences of that fact spring into the mind simultaneously with it. It is a very useful assumption under many circumstances, but one too easily forgets that it is false. A natural consequence of doing so is that one then assumes that there is no virtue in the mere work in working out of consequences from data and general principles.

我认为，机器不能引起意外这一观点源于哲学家和数学家特别容易陷入的一个谬误。这个谬误就是假设：一旦一个事实被呈现给心灵，该事实的所有后果就会同时涌入心灵。在许多情况下，这是一个非常有用的假设，但人们太容易忘记它是错误的。这样做的自然结果是，人们会认为仅仅从数据和一般原理中推导出后果的工作没有任何价值。

(7) Argument from Continuity in the Nervous System.

（7）来自神经系统连续性的论证。

The nervous system is certainly not a discrete-state machine. A small error in the information about the size of a nervous impulse impinging on a neuron, may make a large difference to the size of the outgoing impulse. It may be argued that, this being so, one cannot expect to be able to mimic the behaviour of the nervous system with a discrete-state system.

神经系统当然不是离散状态机。关于冲击神经元的神经冲动大小的信息中一个微小的误差，可能会对传出冲动的大小产生很大的影响。有人可能会论证，既然如此，就不能指望用离散状态系统来模仿神经系统的行为。

It is true that a discrete-state machine must be different from a continuous machine. But if we adhere to the conditions of the imitation game, the interrogator will not be able to take any advantage of this difference. The situation can be made clearer if we consider some other simpler continuous machine. A differential analyser will do very well. (A differential analyser is a certain kind of machine not of the discrete-state type used for some kinds of calculation.) Some of these provide their answers in a typed form, and so are suitable for taking part in the game. It would not be possible for a digital computer to predict exactly what answers the differential analyser would give to a problem, but it would be quite capable of giving the right sort of answer. For instance, if asked to give the value of π (actually about 3.1416) it would be reasonable to choose at random between the values 3.12, 3.13, 3.14, 3.15, 3.16 with the probabilities of 0.05, 0.15, 0.55, 0.19, 0.06 (say). Under these circumstances it would be very difficult for the interrogator to distinguish the differential analyser from the digital computer.

确实，离散状态机必须与连续机器不同。但如果我们遵守模仿游戏的条件，询问者将无法利用这一差异。如果我们考虑另一种更简单的连续机器，情况可以变得更清楚。微分分析仪就很好。（微分分析仪是一种非离散状态类型的机器，用于某些计算。）其中一些以打字形式提供答案，因此适合参与游戏。数字计算机不可能准确预测微分分析仪对某个问题会给出什么答案，但它完全有能力给出正确类型的答案。例如，如果被要求给出π的值（实际上约为3.1416），在3.12、3.13、3.14、3.15、3.16这些值之间随机选择是合理的，概率分别为0.05、0.15、0.55、0.19、0.06（比如说）。在这种情况下，询问者很难区分微分分析仪和数字计算机。

(8) The Argument from Informality of Behaviour.

(8) 来自行为非形式性的论证。

It is not possible to produce a set of rules purporting to describe what a man should do in every conceivable set of circumstances. One might for instance have a rule that one is to stop when one sees a red traffic light, and to go if one sees a green one, but what if by some fault both appear together ? One may perhaps decide that it is safest to stop. But some further difficulty may well arise from this decision later. To attempt to provide rules of conduct to cover every eventuality, even those arising from traffic lights, appears to be impossible. With all this I agree.

不可能制定一套规则，声称能描述一个人在每一种可设想的情况下应该做什么。例如，可能有一条规则：看到红灯就停，看到绿灯就行，但如果由于某种故障两者同时出现呢？也许可以决定最安全的做法是停下。但这一决定之后很可能又会产生进一步的困难。试图提供涵盖一切可能情况的行为规则，即使是那些由交通灯引起的情况，似乎是不可能的。我完全同意这一切。

From this it is argued that we cannot be machines. I shall try to reproduce the argument, but I fear I shall hardly do it justice. It seems to run something like this. ' If each man had a definite set of rules of conduct by which he regulated his life he would be no better than a machine. But there are no such rules. so men cannot be machines.' The undistributed middle is glaring. I do not think the argument is ever put quite like this, but I believe this is the argument used nevertheless. There may however be a certain confusion between ' rules of conduct ' and ' laws of behaviour ' to cloud the issue. By ' rules of conduct ' I mean precepts such as ' Stop if you see red lights ', on which one can act, and of which one can be conscious. By ' laws of behaviour ' I mean laws of nature as applied to a man's body such as ' if you pinch him he will squeak '. If we substitute ' laws of behaviour which regulate his life ' for ' laws of conduct by which he regulates his life ' in the argument quoted the undistributed middle is no longer insuperable. For we believe that it is not only true that being regulated by laws of behaviour implies being some sort of machine (though not necessarily a discrete-state machine), but that conversely being such a machine implies being regulated by such laws. However, we cannot so easily convince ourselves of the absence of complete laws of behaviour as of complete rules of conduct. The only way we know of for finding such laws is scientific observation, and we certainly know of no circumstances under which we could say, ' We have searched enough. There are no such laws.'

由此论证我们不可能成为机器。我将尝试复述这一论证，但恐怕难以做到公正。它似乎大致如下：“如果每个人都有明确的一套行为规则来规范自己的生活，那么他就不比机器好。但不存在这样的规则，所以人不可能是机器。”这里未分配中项的谬误十分明显。我不认为这个论证曾被如此明确地提出，但我相信它确实被这样使用。然而，可能存在“行为规则”与“行为法则”之间的某种混淆，使问题变得模糊。所谓“行为规则”，我指的是诸如“看到红灯就停”这样的准则，人们可以据此行动，并且能够意识到它。所谓“行为法则”，我指的是适用于人体的自然法则，例如“如果你掐他，他就会尖叫”。如果我们在所引用的论证中用“规范其生活的行为法则”替换“他据以规范其生活的行为规则”，那么未分配中项就不再是不可逾越的。因为我们相信，不仅受行为法则支配意味着是某种机器（尽管不一定是离散状态机），而且反过来，作为这样的机器也意味着受这样的法则支配。然而，我们无法像确信不存在完整的行为规则那样，轻易说服自己不存在完整的行为法则。我们已知的发现这类法则的唯一途径是科学观察，而且我们当然不知道在什么情况下可以说：“我们已经搜索得足够多了。不存在这样的法则。”

We can demonstrate more forcibly that any such statement would be unjustified. For suppose we could be sure of finding such laws if they existed. Then given a discrete-state machine it should certainly be possible to discover by observation sufficient about it to predict its future behaviour, and this within a reasonable time, say a thousand years. But this does not seem to be the case. I have set up on the Manchester computer a small programme using only 1000 units of storage, whereby the machine supplied with one sixteen figure number replies with another within two seconds. I would defy anyone to learn from these replies sufficient about the programme to be able to predict any replies to untried values.

我们可以更有力地证明，任何这样的说法都是不合理的。因为假设我们能够确信，如果这样的规律存在，我们就能找到它们。那么给定一台离散状态机，肯定可以通过观察足够多地了解它，从而预测其未来行为，而且是在合理的时间内，比如说一千年内。但情况似乎并非如此。我在曼彻斯特计算机上设置了一个只使用1000个存储单元的小程序，机器在提供给它一个十六位数字后，两秒内回复另一个数字。我敢说，任何人都无法从这些回复中充分了解该程序，从而预测对未尝试值的任何回复。

(9) The Argument from Extra-Sensory Perception.

(9) 来自超感知觉的论证

I assume that the reader is familiar with the idea of extra-sensory perception, and the meaning of the four items of it, viz. telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition and psycho-kinesis. These disturbing phenomena seem to deny all our usual scientific ideas. How we should like to discredit them! Unfortunately the statistical evidence, at least for telepathy, is overwhelming. It is very difficult to rearrange one's ideas so as to fit these new facts in. Once one has accepted them it does not seem a very big step to believe in ghosts and bogies. The idea that our bodies move simply according to the known laws of physics, together with some others not yet discovered but somewhat similar, would be one of the first to go.

我假设读者熟悉超感知觉的概念，以及它的四个项目，即心灵感应、透视、预知和心灵致动。这些令人不安的现象似乎否定了我们所有通常的科学观念。我们多么想否定它们啊！不幸的是，统计证据，至少对于心灵感应来说，是压倒性的。要重新调整自己的观念以适应这些新事实是非常困难的。一旦接受了它们，相信鬼魂和妖怪似乎就不是很大的一步了。认为我们的身体只是按照已知的物理定律运动，再加上一些尚未发现但有些相似的定律，这种想法将是最先被抛弃的。

This argument is to my mind quite a strong one. One can say in reply that many scientific theories seem to remain workable in practice, in spite of clashing with E.S.P. ; that in fact one can get along very nicely if one forgets about it. This is rather cold comfort, and one fears that thinking is just the kind of phenomenon where E.S.P. may be especially relevant.

在我看来，这个论证是相当有力的。人们可以回答说，许多科学理论在实践中似乎仍然可行，尽管与超感知觉相冲突；事实上，如果忘记它，人们可以过得很好。但这只是微不足道的安慰，而且人们担心思维正是超感知觉可能特别相关的现象。

A more specific argument based on E.S.P. might run as follows : " Let us play the imitation game, using as witnesses a man who is good as a telepathic receiver, and a digital computer. The interrogator can ask such questions as ' What suit does the card in my right hand belong to ? ' The man by telepathy or clairvoyance gives the right answer 130 times out of 400 cards. The machine can only guess at random, and perhaps gets 104 right, so the interrogator makes the right identification." There is an interesting possibility which opens here. Suppose the digital computer contains a random number generator. Then it will be natural to use this to decide what answer to give. But then the random number generator will be subject to the psycho-kinetic powers of the interrogator. Perhaps this psycho-kinesis might cause the machine to guess right more often than would be expected on a probability calculation, so that the interrogator might still be unable to make the right identification. On the other hand, he might be able to guess right without any questioning, by clairvoyance. With E.S.P. anything may happen. If telepathy is admitted it will be necessary to tighten our test up. The situation could be regarded as analogous to that which would occur if the interrogator were talking to himself and one of the competitors was listening with his ear to the wall. To put the competitors into a 'telepathy-proof room' would satisfy all requirements.

一个基于超感知觉的更具体论证可能如下：“让我们玩模仿游戏，使用一个擅长心灵感应接收的人和一个数字计算机作为见证者。询问者可以问诸如‘我右手中的牌属于什么花色？’这样的问题。那个人通过心灵感应或透视在400张牌中给出130次正确答案。机器只能随机猜测，也许能猜对104次，因此询问者做出了正确的识别。”这里出现了一个有趣的可能性。假设数字计算机包含一个随机数生成器。那么很自然地会用它来决定给出什么答案。但这样一来，随机数生成器将受到询问者的心理致动能力的影响。也许这种心理致动会导致机器猜对的次数比概率计算所预期的更多，从而使询问者仍然无法做出正确的识别。另一方面，他也许能够不通过任何提问，仅凭透视就猜对。有了超感知觉，任何事情都可能发生。如果承认心灵感应，就有必要收紧我们的测试。这种情况可以类比为询问者自言自语，而其中一个竞争者把耳朵贴在墙上偷听。将竞争者放入一个‘防心灵感应房间’就能满足所有要求。

7. Learning Machines.

7. 学习机器

The reader will have anticipated that I have no very convincing arguments of a positive nature to support my views. If I had I should not have taken such pains to point out the fallacies in contrary views. Such evidence as I have I shall now give.

读者想必已经料到，我并没有非常令人信服的正面论据来支持我的观点。如果我有的话，就不会如此费力地指出相反观点中的谬误了。我现在就给出我所拥有的证据。

Let us return for a moment to Lady Lovelace's objection, which stated that the machine can only do what we tell it to do. One could say that a man can 'inject' an idea into the machine, and that it will respond to a certain extent and then drop into quiescence, like a piano string struck by a hammer. Another simile would be an atomic pile of less than critical size: an injected idea is to correspond to a neutron entering the pile from without. Each such neutron will cause a certain disturbance which eventually dies away. If, however, the size of the pile is sufficiently increased, the disturbance caused by such an incoming neutron will very likely go on and on increasing until the whole pile is destroyed. Is there a corresponding phenomenon for minds, and is there one for machines? There does seem to be one for the human mind. The majority of them seem to be 'sub-critical', i.e. to correspond in this analogy to piles of sub-critical size. An idea presented to such a mind will on average give rise to less than one idea in reply. A smallish proportion are super-critical. An idea presented to such a mind may give rise to a whole 'theory' consisting of secondary, tertiary and more remote ideas. Animals minds seem to be very definitely sub-critical. Adhering to this analogy we ask, 'Can a machine be made to be super-critical?'

让我们暂时回到洛夫莱斯夫人的反对意见，即机器只能做我们让它做的事。可以说，一个人能把一个想法“注入”机器，机器会在一定程度上做出反应，然后归于沉寂，就像琴弦被琴槌敲击一样。另一个比喻是低于临界尺寸的原子反应堆：注入的想法相当于从外部进入反应堆的中子。每个这样的中子都会引起一定的扰动，最终逐渐消失。然而，如果反应堆的尺寸充分增大，由这样一个入射中子引起的扰动很可能持续不断地增强，直到整个反应堆被摧毁。对于心灵，是否存在相应的现象？对于机器呢？人类心灵似乎确实存在这种现象。大多数心灵似乎是“亚临界的”，即在这个类比中对应于亚临界尺寸的反应堆。向这样的心灵呈现一个想法，平均而言引发的回应想法不到一个。一小部分心灵是超临界的。向这样的心灵呈现一个想法，可能会引发一整套“理论”，包括二级、三级以及更间接的想法。动物的心灵似乎非常明确地是亚临界的。遵循这个类比，我们问：“能否让机器成为超临界的？”

The 'skin of an onion' analogy is also helpful. In considering the functions of the mind or the brain we find certain operations which we can explain in purely mechanical terms. This we say does not correspond to the real mind: it is a sort of skin which we must strip off if we are to find the real mind. But then in what remains we find a further skin to be stripped off, and so on. Proceeding in this way do we ever come to the 'real' mind, or do we eventually come to the skin which has nothing in it? In the latter case the whole mind is mechanical. (It would not be a discrete-state machine however. We have discussed this.)

“洋葱皮”的类比也很有帮助。在考察心灵或大脑的功能时，我们发现某些操作可以用纯机械的术语来解释。我们说这并不对应于真正的心灵：它是一种皮，如果我们要找到真正的心灵，就必须把它剥掉。但接着在剩下的部分中，我们又发现还有一层皮要剥掉，如此等等。以这种方式进行下去，我们是否会最终到达“真正的”心灵，还是最终只剩下内部空无一物的外皮？在后一种情况下，整个心灵都是机械的。（然而，它不会是一台离散状态机。我们已经讨论过这一点。）

These last two paragraphs do not claim to be convincing arguments. They should rather be described as 'recitations tending to produce belief'.

最后这两段并不声称是令人信服的论证。它们更应该被描述为“倾向于产生信念的陈述”。

The only really satisfactory support that can be given for the view expressed at the beginning of §6, will be that provided by waiting for the end of the century and then doing the experiment described. But what can we say in the meantime? What steps should be taken now if the experiment is to be successful?

对于第6节开头所表达的观点，唯一真正令人满意的支持将是等到本世纪末，然后进行所描述的实验。但在此期间我们能说什么呢？如果实验要成功，现在应该采取什么步骤？

As I have explained, the problem is mainly one of programming. Advances in engineering will have to be made too, but it seems unlikely that these will not be adequate for the requirements. Estimates of the storage capacity of the brain vary from 10^10 to 10^15 binary digits. I incline to the lower values and believe that only a very small fraction is used for the higher types of thinking. Most of it is probably used for the retention of visual impressions. I should be surprised if more than 10^9 was required for satisfactory playing of the imitation game, at any rate against a blind man. (Note—The capacity of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edition, is 2 × 10^9.) A storage capacity of 10^7 would be a very practicable possibility even by present techniques. It is probably not necessary to increase the speed of operations of the machines at all. Parts of modern machines which can be regarded as analogues of nerve cells work about a thousand times faster than the latter. This should provide a 'margin of safety' which could cover losses of speed arising in many ways. Our problem then is to find out how to programme these machines to play the game. At my present rate of working I produce about a thousand digits of programme a day, so that about sixty workers, working steadily through the fifty years might accomplish the job, if nothing went into the waste-paper basket. Some more expeditious method seems desirable.

10^{10}

In the process of trying to imitate an adult human mind we are bound to think a good deal about the process which has brought it to the state that it is in. We may notice three components,

在试图模仿成年人类心灵的过程中，我们必然会大量思考使其达到当前状态的过程。我们可以注意到三个组成部分，

(a) The initial state of the mind, say at birth, (b) The education to which it has been subjected, (c) Other experience, not to be described as education, to which it has been subjected.

(a) 心灵的初始状态，比如说出生时， (b) 它所接受的教育， (c) 其他经验，不能描述为教育，它所经历过的。

Instead of trying to produce a programme to simulate the adult mind, why not rather try to produce one which simulates the child's ? If this were then subjected to an appropriate course of education one would obtain the adult brain. Presumably the child-brain is something like a note-book as one buys it from the stationers. Rather little mechanism, and lots of blank sheets. (Mechanism and writing are from our point of view almost synonymous.) Our hope is that there is so little mechanism in the child-brain that something like it can be easily programmed. The amount of work in the education we can assume, as a first approximation, to be much the same as for the human child.

与其试图编写一个模拟成人心智的程序，为什么不尝试编写一个模拟儿童心智的程序呢？如果随后对其施以适当的教育过程，就能得到成人的大脑。可以推测，儿童大脑就像从文具店买来的笔记本一样。机制很少，空白页很多。（从我们的观点来看，机制和书写几乎是同义词。）我们的希望是，儿童大脑中的机制如此之少，以至于类似的东西可以很容易地被编程。作为第一近似，我们可以假设教育的工作量与人类儿童大致相同。

We have thus divided our problem into two parts. The 'child-programme and the education process. These two remain very closely connected. We cannot expect to find a good child-machine at the first attempt. One must experiment with teaching one such machine and see how well it learns. One can then try another and see if it is better or worse. There is a.n obvious connection between this process and evolution, by the identifications

因此，我们将问题分成了两个部分：儿童程序和教学过程。这两者仍然紧密相连。我们不能指望第一次尝试就能找到一台好的儿童机器。必须对这样一台机器进行教学实验，看看它学得有多好。然后可以尝试另一台，看看它是更好还是更差。通过以下对应关系，这个过程与进化之间有着明显的联系：

Structure of the child machine = Hereditary material Changes ,, ,, = Mutations Natural selection = Judgment of the experimenter

儿童机器的结构 = 遗传物质 变化 = 突变 自然选择 = 实验者的判断

One may hope, how-ever,that this process will be more expeditious than evolution. The survival of the fittest is a slow method for measuring advantages. The experimenter, by the exercise of intelligence, should be able to speed it up. Equally important is the fact that he is not restricted to random mutations. If he can trace a cause for some weakness he can probably think of the kind of mutation which will improve it.

然而，人们可以希望这个过程会比进化更迅速。适者生存是衡量优势的一种缓慢方法。实验者通过运用智能，应该能够加快这一过程。同样重要的是，他不受随机突变的限制。如果他能够找出某个弱点的原因，他很可能就能想出能够改善它的突变类型。

It will not be possible to apply exactly the same teaching process to the machine as to a normal child. It will not, for instance, be provided with legs, so that it could not be asked to go out and fill the coal scuttle. Possibly it might not have eyes. But however well these deficiencies might be overcome by clever engineering, one could not send the creature to school without the other children making excessive fun of it. I t must be given some tuition. We need not be too concerned about the legs, eyes, etc. The example of Miss Helen Keller shows that education can take place provided that communication in both directions between teacher and pupil can take place by some means or other.

不可能对机器应用与正常儿童完全相同的教学过程。例如，它不会被装上腿，所以不能让它出去给煤斗加煤。它可能也没有眼睛。但无论这些缺陷通过巧妙的工程手段克服得多么好，人们也不能把这个生物送到学校去，否则其他孩子会过分取笑它。必须给它一些指导。我们不必过分担心腿、眼睛等。海伦\cdot凯勒小姐的例子表明，只要教师和学生之间能够通过某种方式进行双向交流，教育就可以进行。

We normally associate punishments and rewards with the teaching process. Some simple child-machines can be constructed or programmed on this sort of principle. The machine has to be so constructed that events which shortly preceded the occurrence of a punishment-signal are unlikely to be repeated, whereas a reward-signal increased the probability of repetition of the events which led up to it. These definitions do not presuppose any feelings on the part of the machine. I have done some experiments with one such child-machine, and succeeded in teaching it a few things, but the teaching method was too unorthodox for the experiment to be considered really successful.

我们通常将惩罚和奖励与教学过程联系起来。一些简单的儿童机器可以按照这种原理来构造或编程。机器的构造必须使得在惩罚信号出现前不久发生的事件不太可能被重复，而奖励信号则增加了导致该奖励的事件被重复的概率。这些定义并不预设机器有任何情感。我曾用这样一台儿童机器做过一些实验，并成功地教会了它一些东西，但教学方法过于非正统，以至于实验不能被认为真正成功。

The use of punishments and rewards can at best be a part of the teaching process. Roughly speaking, if the teacher has no other means of communicating to the pupil, the amount of information which can reach him does not exceed the total number of rewards and punishments applied. By the time a child has learnt to repeat ' Casabianca ' he would probably feel very sore indeed, if the text could only be discovered by a ' Twenty Questions ' technique, every ' NO ' taking the form of a blow. It is necessary therefore to have some other ' unemotional ' channels of communication. If these are available it is possible to teach a machine by punishments and rewards to obey orders given in some language, e.g. a symbolic language. These orders are to be transmitted through the 'unemotional ' channels. The use of this language will diminish greatly the number of punishments and rewards required.

惩罚和奖励的使用充其量只能是教学过程的一部分。粗略地说，如果教师没有其他与学生交流的手段，那么学生能接收到的信息量不会超过所施加的奖励和惩罚的总数。当一个孩子学会重复“卡萨比安卡”时，如果文本只能通过“二十个问题”的技巧来发现，而每一个“不”都以一次打击的形式出现，他可能会感到非常痛苦。因此，有必要拥有其他“非情感”的交流渠道。如果这些渠道可用，就可以通过惩罚和奖励来教机器服从用某种语言（例如符号语言）给出的命令。这些命令将通过“非情感”渠道传输。使用这种语言将大大减少所需的惩罚和奖励的数量。

Opinions may vary as to the complexity which is suitable in the child machine. One might try to make it as simple as possible consistently with the general principles. Alternatively one might have a complete system of logical inference ' built in '.1 In the latter case the store would be largely occupied with definitions and propositions. The propositions would have various kinds of status, e.g. well-established facts, conjectures, mathematically proved theorems, statements given by an authority, expressions having the logical form of proposition but not belief-value. Certain propositions may be described as ' imperatives '. The machine should be so constructed that as soon as an imperative is classed as ' well-established ' the appropriate action automatically takes place. To illustrate this, suppose the teacher says to the machine, ' Do your homework now '. This may cause " Teacher says ' Do your homework now ' " to be included amongst the well-established facts. Another such fact might be, " Everything that teacher says is true ". Combining these may eventually lead to the imperative, ' Do your homework now ', being included amongst the well-established facts, and this, by the construction of the machine, will mean that the homework actually gets started, but the effect is very satisfactory. The processes of inference used by the machine need not be such as would satisfy the most exacting logicians. There might for instance be no hierarchy of types. But this need not mean that type fallacies will occur, any more than we are bound to fall over unfenced cliffs. Suitable imperatives (expressed within the systems, not forming part of the rules of the system) such as ' Do not use a class unless it is a subclass of one which has been mentioned by teacher ' can have a similar effect to ' Do not go too near the edge '.

关于儿童机器适合的复杂性，意见可能有所不同。人们可以尝试使其尽可能简单，同时符合一般原则。或者，可以内置一个完整的逻辑推理系统〔1〕。在后一种情况下，存储将主要由定义和命题占据。命题将具有各种状态，例如：充分确立的事实、猜想、数学证明的定理、权威给出的陈述、具有命题逻辑形式但不具有信念值的表达式。某些命题可以被描述为“命令式”。机器的构造应使得一旦一个命令式被归类为“充分确立”，相应的行动就会自动发生。为了说明这一点，假设教师对机器说：“现在做你的作业”。这可能导致“教师说‘现在做你的作业’”被包含在充分确立的事实中。另一个这样的事实可能是，“老师所说的一切都是真的”。将这些结合起来，最终可能导致命令“现在做你的作业”被纳入公认的事实之中，而根据机器的构造，这将意味着作业实际上开始进行，但效果非常令人满意。机器所使用的推理过程不必满足最严格的逻辑学家的要求。例如，可能没有类型层次。但这并不意味着会出现类型谬误，正如我们并不一定会从没有围栏的悬崖上掉下去一样。适当的命令（在系统内表达，不构成系统规则的一部分），例如“除非一个类是老师提到过的某个类的子类，否则不要使用它”，可以产生类似于“不要太靠近边缘”的效果。

1 Or rather ' programmed in ' for our child-machine will be programmed in a digital computer. But the logical system will not have to be learnt.

1 或者更确切地说是“编程进去”，因为我们的儿童机器将在一台数字计算机中编程。但逻辑系统不必学习。

The imperatives that can be obeyed by a machine that has no limbs are bound to be of a rather intellectual character, as in the example (doing homework) given above. Important amongst such imperatives will be ones which regulate the order in which the rules of the logical system concerned are to be applied. For at each stage when one is using a logical system, there is a very large number of alternative steps, any of which one is permitted to apply, so far as obedience to the rules of the logical system is concerned. These choices make the difference between a brilliant and a footling reasoner, not the difference between a sound and a fallacious one. Propositions leading to imperatives of this kind might be " When Socrates is mentioned, use the syllogism in Barbara " or " If one method has been proved to be quicker than another, do not use the slower method". Some of these may be ' given by authority ', but others may be produced by the machine itself, e.g. by scientific induction.

没有肢体的机器所能服从的命令必然具有相当智力的特征，如上面给出的例子（做作业）。在这些命令中，重要的将是那些规定所涉及的逻辑系统规则应用顺序的命令。因为在使用逻辑系统的每个阶段，就服从逻辑系统规则而言，有大量可供选择的步骤，其中任何一个都是允许应用的。这些选择造成了杰出推理者与平庸推理者之间的差异，而不是正确推理者与谬误推理者之间的差异。导致这类命令的命题可能是“当提到苏格拉底时，使用Barbara三段论”或“如果一种方法已被证明比另一种方法更快，就不要使用较慢的方法”。其中一些可能是“权威给出的”，但另一些可能是机器自身产生的，例如通过科学归纳。

The idea of a learning machine may appear paradoxical to some readers. How can the rules of operation of the machine change ? They should describe completely how the machine will react whatever its history might be, whatever changes it might undergo. The rules are thus quite time-invariant. This is quite true. The explanation of the paradox is that the rules which get changed in the learning process are of a rather less pretentious kind, claiming only an ephemeral validity. The reader may draw a parallel with the Constitution of the United States.

学习机器的想法可能对一些读者来说显得自相矛盾。机器的操作规则怎么能改变呢？它们应该完整地描述机器无论其历史如何、无论经历何种变化都将如何反应。因此，这些规则是完全时间不变的。这确实是真的。对这个悖论的解释是，在学习过程中被改变的规则属于一种不那么自负的类型，只声称具有短暂的有效性。读者可以将其与美国宪法进行类比。

An important feature of a learning machine is that its teacher will often be very largely ignorant of quite what is going on inside, although he may still be able to some extent to predict his pupil's behaviour. This should apply most strongly to the later education of a machine arising from a child-machine of well-tried design (or programme). This is in clear contrast with normal procedure when using a machine to do computations: one's object is then to have a clear mental picture of the state of the machine at each moment in the computation. This object can only be achieved with a struggle. The view that 'the machine can only do what we know how to order it to do', appears strange in face of this. Most of the programmes which we can put into the machine will result in its doing something that we cannot make sense of at all, or which we regard as completely random behaviour. Intelligent behaviour presumably consists in a departure from the completely disciplined behaviour involved in computation, but a rather slight one, which does not give rise to random behaviour, or to pointless repetitive loops. Another important result of preparing our machine for its part in the imitation game by a process of teaching and learning is that 'human fallibility' is likely to be omitted in a rather natural way, i.e. without special 'coaching'. (The reader should reconcile this with the point of view on pp. 24, 25.) Processes that are learnt do not produce a hundred per cent. certainty of result; if they did they could not be unlearnt.

学习机器的一个重要特征是，其教师往往在很大程度上并不清楚机器内部究竟发生了什么，尽管他仍能在一定程度上预测其学生的行为。这一点在后期的机器教育中尤为明显，受教育的机器由一台设计（或程序）经过充分检验的儿童机器发展而来。这与使用机器进行计算时的常规程序形成鲜明对比：在后一种情况下，人们的目标是在计算的每一时刻都对机器的状态有一个清晰的心理图景。这个目标只能通过努力才能实现。面对这一事实，“机器只能做我们知道如何命令它去做的事情”这一观点显得很奇怪。我们能够输入机器的大多数程序都会导致它做出我们完全无法理解的事情，或者我们认为完全是随机行为。智能行为大概在于偏离计算中所涉及的完全有纪律的行为，但这种偏离相当轻微，不会导致随机行为，也不会导致无意义的重复循环。通过教与学的过程为我们的机器在模仿游戏中扮演角色做准备的另一个重要结果是，“人类的易错性”很可能会以一种相当自然的方式被省略，即无需特殊的“指导”。（读者应将这一点与第24、25页的观点相协调。）学习到的过程不会产生百分之百确定的结果；如果它们产生了，它们就不可能被遗忘。

It is probably wise to include a random element in a learning machine (see p. 438). A random element is rather useful when we are searching for a solution of some problem. Suppose for instance we wanted to find a number between 50 and 200 which was equal to the square of the sum of its digits, we might start at 51 then try 52 and go on until we got a number that worked. Alternatively we might choose numbers at random until we got a good one. This method has the advantage that it is unnecessary to keep track of the values that have been tried, but the disadvantage that one may try the same one twice, but this is not very important if there are several solutions. The systematic method has the disadvantage that there may be an enormous block without any solutions in the region which has to be investigated first. Now the learning process may be regarded as a search for a form of behaviour which will satisfy the teacher (or some other criterion). Since there is probably a very large number of satisfactory solutions the random method seems to be better than the systematic. It should be noticed that it is used in the analogous process of evolution. But there the systematic method is not possible. How could one keep track of the different genetical combinations that had been tried, so as to avoid trying them again?

在学习机中纳入一个随机元素可能是明智的（见第438页）。当我们寻找某个问题的解决方案时，随机元素相当有用。例如，假设我们想找到一个介于50和200之间的数，它等于其各位数字之和的平方，我们可以从51开始，然后尝试52，一直继续直到得到一个有效的数。或者，我们可以随机选择数字，直到得到一个好的数字。这种方法的优点是不必记录已经尝试过的值，但缺点是可能两次尝试同一个值，不过如果有多个解，这并不太重要。系统方法的缺点是，在必须首先调查的区域中可能存在一个巨大的无解区块。现在，学习过程可以被视为对一种行为形式的搜索，该行为形式将满足教师（或某种其他标准）。由于可能存在着非常大量的令人满意的解，随机方法似乎比系统方法更好。应当注意，它在类似的进化过程中被使用。但在那里，系统方法是不可能的。人们如何能记录已经尝试过的不同遗传组合，以避免再次尝试它们呢？

Compare Lady Lovelace's statement (p. 450), which does not contain the word 'only'.

比较洛夫莱斯夫人的陈述（第450页），其中不包含“只”这个词。

We may hope that machines will eventually compete with men in all purely intellectual fields. But which are the best ones to start with? Even this is a difficult decision. Many people think that a very abstract activity, like the playing of chess, would be best. It can also be maintained that it is best to provide the machine with the best sense organs that money can buy, and then teach it to understand and speak English. This process could follow the normal teaching of a child. Things would be pointed out and named, etc. Again I do not know what the right answer is, but I think both approaches should be tried.

我们可以希望，机器最终将在所有纯粹智力领域与人类竞争。但最好从哪些领域开始呢？即使这也是一个困难的决定。许多人认为，像下棋这样非常抽象的活动是最好的。也可以主张，最好为机器配备金钱能买到的最好的感觉器官，然后教它理解和说英语。这个过程可以遵循对孩子的正常教学。事物会被指出来并命名，等等。我仍然不知道正确的答案是什么，但我认为两种方法都应该尝试。

We can only see a short distance ahead, but we can see plenty there that needs to be done.

我们只能看到前方很短的距离，但我们可以看到那里有大量需要完成的工作。

BIBLIOGRAPHY

参考文献

Samuel Butler, Erewhon, London, 1865. Chapters 23, 24, 25, The Book of the Machines.

Samuel Butler：《埃瑞璜》（Erewhon），伦敦，1865年，第23、24、25章“机器之书”。

Alonzo Church, "An Unsolvable Problem of Elementary Number Theory", American J. of Math., 58 (1936), 345-363.

Alonzo Church：“初等数论中的一个不可解问题”，American Journal of Mathematics，第58卷（1936年），第345-363页。

K. Gödel, "Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme, I", Monatshefte für Math. und Phys., 1931, 173-189.

K. Gödel：“论《数学原理》及相关系统中的形式不可判定命题 I”，Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik（1931年），第173-189页。

D. R. Hartree, Calculating Instruments and Machines, New York, 1949.

D. R. Hartree：《计算仪器与机器》，纽约，1949年。

S. C. Kleene, "General Recursive Functions of Natural Numbers", American J. of Math., 57 (1935), 153-173 and 219-244.

S. C. Kleene：“自然数上的一般递归函数”，American Journal of Mathematics，第57卷（1935年），第153-173及219-244页。

G. Jefferson, "The Mind of Mechanical Man". Lister Oration for 1949. British Medical Journal, vol. i (1949), 1105-1121.

G. Jefferson：“机械人的心智”（1949年利斯特演说），British Medical Journal，第i卷（1949年），第1105-1121页。

Countess of Lovelace, 'Translator's notes to an article on Babbage's Analytical Engine', Scientific Memoirs (ed. by R. Taylor), vol. 3 (1842), 691-731.

洛夫莱斯伯爵夫人：“巴贝奇分析机论文的译者注释”，Scientific Memoirs，R. Taylor 编，第3卷（1842年），第691-731页。

Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, London, 1940.

Bertrand Russell：《西方哲学史》，伦敦，1940年。

A. M. Turing, "On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem", Proc. London Math. Soc. (2), 42 (1937), 230-265.

A. M. Turing：“论可计算数及其在判定问题上的应用”，Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society，第2辑，第42卷（1937年），第230-265页。

Victoria University of Manchester.

曼彻斯特维多利亚大学。

Archive cover

档案封面

Computing Machinery and Intelligence

计算机器与智能

A. M. Turing

A. M. 图灵

Mind, New Series, Vol. 59, No. 236. (Oct., 1950), pp. 433-460.

《心灵》，新系列，第59卷，第236期（1950年10月），第433-460页。

Stable URL:

稳定链接：

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423%28195010%292%3A59%3A236%3C433%3ACMAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5

Mind is currently published by Oxford University Press.

《心灵》目前由牛津大学出版社出版。

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html . JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

您使用JSTOR档案即表示您接受JSTOR的使用条款与条件，详见 http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html。JSTOR的使用条款与条件部分规定，除非您已获得事先许可，否则不得下载整期期刊或多篇文章副本，且您仅可将JSTOR档案中的内容用于个人、非商业用途。

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/oup.html .

有关本作品的任何进一步使用，请联系出版商。出版商联系信息可在 http://www.jstor.org/journals/oup.html 获取。

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR传输内容的任何部分的每一份副本都必须包含与屏幕或打印页面上显示的相同版权声明。

JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

JSTOR是一个独立的非营利组织，致力于建立和保存学术期刊的数字档案。有关JSTOR的更多信息，请联系 support@jstor.org。

http://www.jstor.org

Thu Apr 5 11:21:34 2007

2007年4月5日 星期四 11:21:34